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Abstract 
This article discusses the rise of an approach to philanthropic giving known as 
philanthrocapitalism. I relate it to a new paradigm in management theory that has claimed that 
private profit-making naturally aligns with improved public welfare. I show how growing belief 
in the inherent ‘compatibility’ of corporate missions and public benefits has led to new laws and 
contributed to major shifts in how giving practices are structured and legitimated. The original 
point made in this article is that the philanthrocapitalist turn is more than simply an 
organizational change in the structure of different philanthropic institutions. Rather, the belief 
that profit-making and public welfare are naturally aligned also has significant, undertheorized 
implications for different principles in European-American legal traditions. The ascendancy of 
the philanthrocapitalist approach represents a subtle but profound displacement of belief in the 




Philanthrocapitalism is a term and a practice that encapsulates important recent legal precedents 
within organized philanthropy. First coined 15 years ago, philanthrocapitalism is one of many 
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new neologisms applied to hybrid investment and giving initiatives that seek to marry the aims 
of the for-profit sector with the goals of nonprofit organizations. Other terms include venture 
philanthropy, impact investment, and triple-bottom line, to name a few (Barman 2016, Nicholls 
2009). These related terms and practices share an underlying belief in the value of applying tools 
and methods from business management to nonprofits, in theory to improve the performance of 
the latter. It has influenced a wide range of development and health programs at organizations 
such as the World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the European Commission 
(Adams 2016, Al Dahdah 2019, Crane et al. 2014, McGoey 2015, Moeller 2018, Natile 2020, 
Richey & Ponte 2011). 
In some ways, philanthrocapitalism has longstanding origins in the rise of scientific 
philanthropy in the era of influential donors such as John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie 
(Soskis 2014, Zunz 2011). What is new today is the pervasiveness of harmony attitudes to the 
relationship between business and society, one that contrasts with previous classical liberal 
attitudes, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to the concentration of power. Despite how 
they are understood by some economists today, classical liberals such as Adam Smith were 
conflict theorists. A core aspect of their thought is recognition of a fundamental, intractable 
conflict between private power and public welfare. This belief contributed to the well-known, 
foundational focus in both jurisprudence and political theory on achieving a balance of power 
through deliberate checks, divisions, and legislated divisions in authority (Boucoyannis 2007; 
McGoey 2019; Weingast 1997, 2017). 
Balance of power theorists’ recognition of an inherent, intractable conflict between private 
interests and larger society has been obscured by later shared-value practitioners, leading to an 
ideological shift that has enabled today’s equivalents to Rockefeller and Carnegie—well-known 
donors such as Bill and Melinda Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, and Priscilla Chan—to champion 
private forms of governance and rich-to-rich giving in a manner that is significantly different 
from earlier eras. Today’s approach also differs from policy principles that underpinned earlier 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) movements, which emerged from nongovernmental 
organization and activist concerns over corporate externalities such as environmental degradation 
and human rights abuses in global corporate supply chains. Although corporations quickly grew 
adept at turning CSR critique into advantage by successfully mobilizing CSR rhetoric to 
advocate for and implement self-regulation (Bartley 2018, Shamir 2010), at its core the CSR 
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movement emphasized the need to curb corporate predation through regulation and a fairer 
redistribution of profits. Today’s philanthrocapitalism is different. Proponents emphasize not 
corporate restraint but rather corporate expansion in the realms of public education, global 
health, and development (Akugizibwe 2020, Birn 2014, Edwards 2010). This shift has neglected 
importance for doctrines of the separation of powers in law and governance. 
The structure is as follows. First, I introduce philanthrocapitalism and its history, with a 
focus on new actors who encompass a philanthrocapitalist approach, including the Gates 
Foundation and newer organizations such as the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, which was 
established not as a traditional foundation but rather as a for-profit limited-liability company 
(LLC). The establishment of LLCs as purported giving vehicles marks a major departure from 
earlier approaches to charitable distribution and investment, with important new legal 
ramifications when it comes to transparency and disclosure requirements. In short, LLCs are 
subject to far fewer disclosure stipulations than earlier philanthropic foundations, which makes it 
harder to follow the money and empirically study grant disbursements (Reckhow 2017, 2020). 
The rise of for-profit LLCs is simply one example of how earlier belief in an inherent conflict 
between private gains and public goods has shifted. Surveying and building upon the growing 
field of critical philanthropy research, I describe other legal examples [such as the Supreme 
Court decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores (2014) that help to illustrate the legal and 
governance ramifications of new gifting practices (Morey 2014). Over the last section, I contrast 
new harmony assumptions with earlier classical liberal attitudes to inherent conflicts and the 
importance of a separation of powers. 
 
ORIGINS OF PHILANTHROCAPITALISM 
The term philanthrocapitalism emerged in the mid-2000s, coined by a business journalist at 
The Economist who later coauthored an influential book, Philanthrocapitalism: How the Rich 
Can Save the World (Bishop & Green 2008). The notion is driven by the belief that private 
corporations and investors can and should embrace the notions of “doing good by doing well” by 
partnering with governments in development and health initiatives in ways that enable corporate 
actors to deliver public services more efficiently, while simultaneously increasingly private 
profits for a handful of actors (Porter & Kramer 1999, 2002). 
The suggestion that investors and wealthy donors can “do social good” through seeking 
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“profit in unprofitable pursuits” (Elkington & Hartigan 2008, p. 15) hails from the success of a 
thought alliance of promarket economists and management scholars stretching back decades. 
This broad-based epistemic community cleared conceptual ground for what was eventually 
termed philanthrocapitalism through dozens of articles published in outlets such as the Harvard 
Business Review over the 1980s and 1990s.  
Their influential article, “The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy” (Porter & 
Kramer 1999), argued that corporations should pursue philanthropic strategies that generated 
greater financial returns, thus “creating shared value” for both shareholders and the wider 
community. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this idea gained wide traction at corporations and across the 
finance sector. As one critical article on the phenomenon noted wryly, given that the concept was 
created “for and with senior leaders in large corporations, it is little surprise that it has succeeded 
in gaining a substantial and positive practitioner audience” (Crane et al. 2014: 132; see also 
Haydon et al 2021).  The World Economic Forum at Davos has hosted numerous roundtables on 
the notion. The EU Commission’s 2011–2014 strategy on CSR adopted shared value as an 
official strategy. A later article by Kramer & Porter (2011) in the Harvard Business Review titled 
“Creating Shared Value” has been cited more than 10,000 times and was awarded the McKinsey 
article of the year award in 2011. Related trends and terms, including instrumental philanthropy 
(see Mitchell & Calabrese 2020 for a review; strategic philanthropy (Brest 2012), and effective 
altruism (MacAskill 2016), largely accept the central premise of creating-shared-value theory, 
that aligning charitable efforts with business opportunities can generate financial returns while 
producing social benefits, thus in theory enlarging the financial resources available to do even 
more good socially. 
This logic, rooted in the idea of using finance to expand economic wealth that will benefit 
wider society, appears like a seductive win-win scenario for both investors and marginalized 
beneficiaries. The belief is influential outside management schools, underpinning, for example, 
the psychologist Steven Pinker’s concept of shared prosperity, popularized in bestsellers like 
Enlightenment Now, in which he argues that the eighteenth-century classical economist Adam 
Smith originated the idea that private profits inevitably confer public gains. Pinker (2018, p. 102)  
claims that Smith pioneered the belief that “whatever tendency people have to care for their 
families and themselves can work to the good of all.” Gates (2008) reiterated this, stating that 
Smith’s theories are a bedrock of Gates’s personal philosophy of “creative capitalism”: his belief 
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that the “fortunes of others” could be tied to “our fortunes—in ways that help advance both.” 
Established in 2000, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is hailed as a touchstone 
exemplar of the promarket, procorporate shift in philanthropy and development circles. Bishop & 
Green (2008) points to the Foundation as heralding a new, golden age, similar to the turn of the 
twentieth century, when Carnegie and Rockefeller ramped up their charitable giving. In some 
ways, however, this claim of a new high period of organized philanthropy is exaggerated. For 
one thing, overall philanthropic giving in the United States has actually stayed level at about 2% 
of the overall gross domestic product (GDP) since the 1970s, after rising to that proportionate 
level over the 1950–1970s (Duquette 2019, Soskis 2017). 
Individual foundations have proliferated since the 1990s, both in the United States and 
globally, but in the United States, the number of new foundations has not led to a proportionate 
increase in foundation giving in relation to GDP growth. Bishop & Green (2008) also 
downplayed the importance of individual bequests from low- and middle-income families, who 
proportionately give more of their incomes to philanthropy that the rich do (Callahan 2017), 
often with less tax incentive to do so. As Reich (2018) points out, poorer, individual families 
receive fewer tax advantages from charity than the rich do because of how US tax returns are 
structured. 
Just as US philanthropic giving has stayed flat at approximately 2% of the GDP since the 
1970s, giving by US foundations, such as the Gates Foundation, toward domestic and global 
health programs overseas is dwarfed, as the United States–based Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation has detailed, by the amount that developing countries spend on health out of their 
own revenue (Inst. Health Metr. Eval. 2010; see McGoey et al. 2018). Giving by private 
philanthropies is also considerably smaller than overseas development aid from governments. 
The Gates Foundation, for example, disburses approximately $1 and $2 billion each year toward 
global health initiatives. Approximately $500 million of this overall funding is granted to the 
WHO, which places the Gates Foundation on par with governments such as the United Kingdom 
and the United States as one of the WHO’s top donors. Although this is a significant outlay, one 
that has positioned the Foundation to influence WHO decision making (Garrett 2012, Youde 
2012), the Gates Foundation’s grants toward global health and development are still far less than 
cumulative governmental development aid earmarked for global health, which amounts to $38 
billion annually. What is really new about the role and disbursements of new philanthropic actors 
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such as the Gates Foundation is not the scale in relation to the size of the US economy, or 
relative to either overseas government aid or domestic governmental spending on health. The 
main difference with the recent philanthrocapitalist shift is the hands-on involvement of activist 
foundation leaders, such as Bill and Melinda Gates personally, in championing a new, business-
oriented approach, including giving nonrepayable grants directly to for-profit corporate 
recipients in an unprecedented manner (McGoey 2015, Schwab 2020). 
 
THE PRO-PROFIT TURN: ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTS 
Putting scholarly notions of shared value into practice, over the noughties, the Gates Foundation 
began to promote the practice of partnering with the business sector in novel ways. In a speech at 
the World Economic Forum, Bill Gates (2008) labeled this approach creative capitalism, which 
he defined as “an approach where governments, business, and nonprofits work together to stretch 
the reach of market forces so that more people can make a profit, or gain recognition, doing work 
that eases the world’s inequities.” 
This stated goal—to stretch market forces globally and to combine profit with the pursuit 
of social welfare—is at the core of the Gates Foundation’s practices, from public education, 
where its grants have been focused on funding charter schools, many of which operate on 
competitive, for-profit principles (Barkan 2016, Ravitch 2010, Tompkins-Stange 2016a) to its 
emphasis in its work in global health and global development on funding the entry of corporate 
actors into new markets, such as contributing $7.5 million in 2010 to a partnership with Coca-
Cola in Uganda and Kenya than enabled “mango and passion fruit farmers to participate in Coca-
Cola’s supply chain for the first time” (TechnoServe 2010).  
This effort is both ideational—in the sense of ideological framings that champion a 
promarket, procorporate ethos—and practical, through grants that improve corporate 
opportunities for multinational companies (Birn 2014; Harman 2016; McGoey 215). For 
example, Melinda Gates (2010) gave a TED talk in 2010 on “What Nonprofits Can Learn from 
Coca-Cola,” at a time when the Gates Foundation had one-tenth of the Foundation’s endowment 
invested in Coca-Cola. This praise fueled concern and criticism among public health experts 
(Stuckler et al. 2011), who argued that such promotion made it harder for other public health 
actors to press home an alternative message, that governments needed to better regulate and deter 
Coca-Cola’s aggressive marketing of sugary drinks linked to obesity (O’Connor 2015, Stuckler 
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et al. 2011). 
The championing of Coca-Cola speaks to an important reality:creating reputational 
advantages and market opportunities for Coca-Cola and other companies was never a 
surreptitious goal of the Foundation’s work. Rather, it isa clearly stated objective, resonating 
with Bill Gates’s (2008) explicitly stated aim two years earlier “to stretch the reach of market 
forces globally.” In other words, the openness of the alignment of profit and philanthropy is both 
the novelty of philanthrocapitalism and the key conundrum for scholars (McGoey 2015). What is 
the “mode of development” [Durkheim 2004 (1893), p. 60] of this new collective consciousness? 
And why does it thrive despite, as I detail below, damning evidence showing that poor groups 
are not winning from this purported win-win (Beaumont 2020, Crane et al. 2014). 
As part of its procorporate orientation, the Gates Foundation has offered an 
unprecedented number of large, nonrepayable grants to large corporate recipients, including 
Scholastic, Vodacom, and Mastercard, which received an $11 million grant in 2014 to establish a 
center for financial inclusion in Nairobi (see McGoey 2015, Schwab 2020). The Gates 
Foundation treated these corporate gifts as part of its minimum-payment obligation, the legal 
requirement to disburse at least 5% of the size of its endowment to charitable ends each year.1 
Offering large grants to for-profit corporations is unusual because the Internal Revenue Service 
has laws against private inurement, the use of tax-privileged gifts for personal or investor gains 
rather than public benefit. US federal charity laws are guided by several long-standing principles, 
rooted ultimately in the late-Enlightenment enshrinement of the belief that private profit seeking 
can be a source of governmental corruption, undermining democratic governance (Cordelli 2016, 
2020; Reich 2018). The laws prevent foundations from using gifts (a) as a form of political 
lobbying, (b) in ways that personally benefits a benefactor or a small circle of her or his friends, 
and (c) in a manner that stores wealth indefinitely without gifting it (the reasons for minimum-
payment obligations compelling distributions of at least 5% of endowments each year) (cf 
Madoff 2010, Mitchell & Calabrese 2020). 
In general, this means that foundations should and do make the majority of their grants to 
nonprofit organizations, in particular 501(c)3 organizations, the designation for nonprofits that 
 





have a religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purpose. Philanthropic foundations 
can offer grants to profit-making groups but must comply with additional procedures known as 
expenditure responsibility rules, ensuring through due diligence that any gifts are strictly for 
charitable purposes. The Gates Foundation maintains that its gifts to corporations are of this 
nature. As a Foundation representative explained to me via email, “In the case of Scholastic, we 
have treated it exactly as we would any grant to a for-profit entity, which is to say that we have 
followed all of the expenditure responsibility rules.”2 
This practice, however, has begun to attract critical media scrutiny, as observers have 
queried the unprecedent scale and legality of the Gates Foundation’s gifts to for-profit corporate 
recipients (Schwab 2020). Scholars such as Piketty (2014) have observed that excessive financial 
returns to the private sector in comparison to stagnating overall national growth levels are one of 
the prime drivers of widening economic inequality today. By gifting nonrepayable grants to 
wealthy corporations, the Gates Foundation is exacerbating this imbalance in returns to the 
private and public sectors. As well as moral and economic questions about whether gifts to 
corporations contribute to worsening economic inequality, such gifts raise a legal question: Are 
they in line with the legal onus to ensure all grants are used for strictly charitable purposes? 
In the case of Mastercard, the response seems no, given that Mastercard (2014) itself 
issued a press release that underscored the commercial purposes of the grant, stating, “The grant 
enables MasterCard to reach into these new markets that may otherwise be commercially 
unviable.” The grant, in short, is a nonrepayable donation to shareholders and executives at 
Mastercard, subsidized by US taxpayers. Since making the grant, the Gates Foundation teamed 
up with the Mastercard Foundation to fund market research at trade bodies that represent the 
financial interests of companies such as Mastercard. For example, both the Gates and Mastercard 
foundations have offered millions in grants to GSMA, a trade organization that “represents the 
interests of mobile operators worldwide.” The gifts are made for the purpose of carrying out 
market research that “evaluates the profitability of mobile money by estimating profit margins 
for three different scenarios” (Almazán & Vonthron 2014, p. 4). 
This use of philanthropic foundations to bankroll market research at corporate trade 
organizations that lobby on behalf of a parent company highlights what is new about the 
 
2 Email from C. Williams, Gates Foundation, to L. McGoey, on Sept. 2, 2015. 
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philanthrocapitalist turn. In short, what is new is not the practice but rather the unprecedented 
scale of gifts to corporations, and with it growing questions about the legality of new blurred 
boundaries between profit and public purpose. The Gates Foundation is not unique in 
collaborating with the private sector. Like other philanthropic organizations, such as the 
Rockefeller Foundation, it makes program-related investments to for-profit recipients, a practice 
with a 40-year history. They can be offered to for-profit recipients in a way that can be legally 
treated as qualifying disbursements that enjoy tax privileges, as long as (a) production of income 
or appreciation of property is not a significant purpose of the grants; (b) the grants are not used 
for political lobbying; and (c) expenditure responsibility rules are followed, ensuring any gifts 
are strictly charitable. These regulations are intended to limit the problem of inurement and 
private benefit, which is “generally understood as providing unjust enrichment from the 
organization’s gross or net earnings to another party” (Chan 2012). This emphasis on “strictly 
charitable” is the conundrum. Do grants to carry out market research on behalf of multinational 
companies qualify as strictly charitable? 
Importantly, inurement refers not simply to private benefit for a benefactor but also to 
third parties who are positioned to exploit foundation resources for private gain. The Internal 
Revenue Code defines it as follow: “No part of the net earnings [of a nonprofit may inure] to the 
benefit of any private shareholder or individual” (quoted in Mitchell & Calabrese 2020). The 
Gates Foundation insists that it meets the strictly charitable standard because a gift to Mastercard 
aids financial inclusion of unbanked groups who lack access to sufficient credit opportunities, 
thus purportedly improving poverty. But evidence for this assertion is mixed as best, and 
damning in many respects, as the outgoing UN rapporteur on extreme poverty stated in a final 
report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2020 (Alston 2020). 
In this report, the outgoing rapporteur, Philip Alston (2020, p. 19), castigated private-
sector solutions to poverty as “a blind alley…this trend represents an abdication of responsibility 
by governments and international organizations.” He was particularly critical of the Gates 
Foundation’s promotion of “win-win” promises,’ which he described as “fairy tales” that enabled 
“companies and investors to draw guaranteed profits from public coffers, while poor 
communities are neglected and underserved” (quoted in Beaumont 2020). When it comes to the 
Gates Foundation’s belief that mobile banking and other forms of financial inclusion can 
alleviate poverty, some evidence supports this claim, showing positive, but fairly negligible, 
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benefits in poverty alleviation by improving savings by 10 cents a day in some households, for 
example (Piper 2020). 
More worrying, however, is growing evidence of rising household debt as mobile 
banking has facilitated predatory lending in Kenya and other nations, leading recently to 
regulatory efforts to crack down on usurious lending. As Quartz Africa reports, traditional 
banking requires collateral and credit checks, whereas the mobile banking arena has, to date, 
been “largely unregulated” and has increased household debt (Kazeem 2020). 
Terming the problem perpetual debt, anthropologists Donovan & Park (2019) note that 
Kenya’s poor and middle-class users, who “were among the first to benefit from digital lending 
apps”—now refer to mobile lending apps as “slavery” (see also Natile 2020). Odundo Owuor 
(2019) points out that mobile “services have improved access to loans, but there are questions 
about whether the poor are being abused in the process,” as studies show that 1 in 5 recipients 
struggle to repay loans, double the rate of standard bank loans. Surveys show that in Kenya, 
“35% of borrowing is for consumption, including ordinary household needs,” rather than 
“emergencies,” as salaries fail to rise with living costs, and as using mobile banking apps for 
gambling expands, especially among young users (Odundo Owuor 2019). In 2020, the Kenyan 
Central Bank proposed new laws to fight predatory lending through mobile apps, requiring 
lenders to apply for permission to increase lending rates and offer new products (Kazeem 2020). 
Meanwhile, for credit companies such as Mastercard, gifted millions by the Gates 
Foundation, the upside is much clearer. A 2019 McKinsey report noted the global payments 
sector reached “$1.9 trillion in 2018, reflecting 6% growth,” following “a year of unprecedented, 
double-digit growth in 2017” (McKinsey 2019). In a pattern that closely mirrors the earlier 
practice of microcredit and microlending, which also saw a rise in indebtedness with negligible 
gains when it came to global poverty alleviation, mobile banking has produced lightly regulated 
gains for investors, many based in the West, while benefits for African households are so far 
marginal—at the same time that the problem of growing household indebtedness expands (Cull 
et al. 2016, Gabor & Brooks 2017, Ghosh 2013, Toyama 2011). 
Aside from facilitating predatory lending, the unusual precedent set by enriching 
lucrative corporations such as Mastercard has worrying slippery-slope implications when it 
comes to other corporate beneficiaries. If the Gates Foundation can offer tax-privileged gifts to 
Mastercard and Scholastic, while maintaining that such gifts are strictly charitable, then any 
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private foundation could gift millions to any corporation, including Exxon, Blackrock, Amazon, 
or Facebook, even when the chief outcome is enhanced revenue for the rich and rising household 
indebtedness among the poor (Ghosh 2013). Twenty years ago, it was widely viewed as 
outlandish that Mastercard could successfully lobby for nonrepayable gifts from a philanthropic 
foundation to expand its mobile payment operations in lucrative markets such as Kenya. Today, 
such rich-to-rich gifting practices are becoming more commonplace, legitimated by a mantra of 
“doing good by doing well.” In a way, the mantra is half right. Many investors and corporations, 
such as Mastercard, are financially benefiting from new global development opportunities 
furnished by US philanthropic foundations (McGoey 2015). But many impoverished and 
increasingly indebted groups are losing out in the process (Gabor & Brooks 2017, Natile 2020). 
The belief that doing good and doing well can and do go hand-in-hand has culminated in 
one of the most extreme changes in philanthropy recently, which is the decision by Mark 
Zuckerberg and other donors, including Laurene Powell Jobs, to establish for-profit LLCs to 
ostensibly gift their wealth—instead of more traditional philanthropic foundations. LLCs confers 
significant regulatory benefits on investors. For example, there is no legal duty for the the tax 
filings for the Zuckerberg Chan Initiative to be made public or to provide a public list of the  
grants disbursed (Carter 2015, McGoey et al. 2018) This marks an antidemocratic organizational 
shift that makes it impossible for academics to carry out external academic investigation 
(Reckhow 2017). Whether or not one is critical of the Gates Foundation’s disbursements, at least 
their giving is transparent, in that every grant by law must be listed on publicly accessible 990 
forms. This is not case for LLCs set up by Zuckerberg or Powell Jobs, which are not beholden to 
publicly share all disbursements, leaving benefactors free to broadcast success stories while 
veiling failed or self-serving disbursements (Carter 2015, Reckhow 2017). 
The same problem of nontransparency plagues efforts to measure grants made by another 
distinctive but related organizational shift over recent decades, which is the explosive growth of 
donor-advised funds (DAFs), charitable entities operated by investment fund managers on behalf 
of donors. Donors who make a gift, such as stock, to a DAF receive a tax benefit for that 
contribution, while relinquishing control over how and when that gift is disbursed for charitable 
purposes. Importantly, DAFs are not subject to the same minimum pay-out rules as foundations, 
nor must they publicly disclose the specific type or scale of their grants. As reporter Jane Mayer 
(2020) writes, “Donor-advised funds have become increasingly controversial, in part because 
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they impede transparency.” Law scholars such as Ray Madoff argue that this secrecy undermines 
the onus to ensure public benefit from gestures that have considerable tax advantages, and which, 
perhaps even more importantly than tax advantages, generate reputational gains for donors. As 
Madoff has emphasized, large-scale gifts attract headline praise in the media, while in reality the 
money is often warehoused indefinitely (Cullen & Madoff 2016). Even wealthy individuals are 
querying the self-serving nature of such gifting vehicles. Billionaire philanthropist John Arnold 
and with Madoff have campaigned together for new federal legislation holding DAFs to some of 
the same regulations that private foundations are beholden to,(Gunther 2020), leading to a senate 
bill introduced in 2021. 
Although DAFs claim to give away far higher percentages annually than the 5% 
minimum payment that foundations must make, there is little way to externally vet this claim, or 
to legally enforce the standardization of large annual payouts, because legally, the money can sit 
dormant for decades without being distributed. In 2020, the California Association of Nonprofits 
and dozens of other individual nongovernmental organizations backed a proposed law that would 
have compelled all large DAFs based in California to report the asset size and grant distributions 
that each disaggregated fund within a larger umbrella group makes each year. After lobbying by 
industry groups such as Fidelity Investments, who argued that such a bill might discourage 
charitable giving, the California bill was withdrawn (Kavate 2020). 
The fact that offshoots of large investment services companies such as Fidelity are now 
influential players in the world of charity is simply one of the many ways that boundaries 
between private advantage and public interest have shifted and blurred over the past 20 years, 
and, importantly, these shifts have not passed unremarked. There has been a remarkable 
flowering of critical philanthropy scholarship in recent years, as well as more critical journalism 
(e.g., Giridharadas 2018, Schwab 2020) than was visible over the noughties. In 2006, as 
Tompkins-Stange (2016b) notes, a study of media reporting found that 98% of press coverage on 
philanthropy was either positive or neutral. There were important exceptions (notably Dowie 
2001), but not nearly the same growing media attention as today, thanks partly to the influence of 
critical academic scholarship that I turn to next. 
 
PHILANTHROCAPITALISM MEETS ITS CRITICS 
The financial crisis of 2007–2008 onward has been a key catalyst for the recent flowering of 
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critical philanthropy scholarship, and particularly to the rise of a more critical attitude to shared-
value rhetoric and practices. Scholars such as Hacker, Pierson, Keister, Piketty, and others had 
long been calling attention to widening inequality, but it took the crisis to sharpen focus on the 
specific role of finance-led wealth concentration and corporate governance failures in 
compounding inequality (Hacker & Pierson 2010). Since then, scholarship on philanthropy and 
the power of gifts has also been re-centered at the heart of the social sciences (c.f. Barman 2016, 
2017; Bekkers 2010; Depecker et al. 2018; Eikenberry & Mirabella 2018; Goss 2016; Harvey et 
al 2020, Lefevre 2018, Madoff 2010, Mahajan 2019, Mears 2020; Mediavilla & Garcia-Ari 
2018, Mitchell & Sparke 2015; Morey 2021, Villaneuva 2018), revitalizing attention to the role 
that intersecting elites play in legitimating concentrations of power (Hay & Muller 2014, 
Kuldova 2017, Littler 2017, McGoey 2015, Savage & Williams 2008, Sayer 2012). 
Recent scholarship has challenged Bishop & Green’s claim (2008) that today’s large donors 
are uniquely interested in more effective philanthropy, underscoring that Rockefeller and 
Carnegie were also explicit about applying tools of scientific management to improving 
outcomes (Soskis 2014). The reality is not that earlier practitioners had little interest in 
measurement but rather, as scholars such as Barman, Buchanan, and Katz emphasize, that social 
change cannot be reduced to key metrics of business success, such as financial bottom lines 
(Barman 2016, Buchanan 2019, Katz 2005). The recent furor for measuring success not only is 
simplistic and ahistorical but can be counterproductive, leading to short-termism and the 
diversion of funds from important social movements that deserve support but where change 
might be so gradual that no outcomes appear for decades. Another focus of recent critical 
scholarship is the relationship between philanthropy and different types of inequality. At the 
global level, research shows that US philanthropic foundations historically and today have used 
their influence to bolster US political supremacy and resource extraction benefiting Europe- and 
North America–based investors and corporations (McGoey 2015, Parmar 2012, Vogel 2006). At 
the national level, research on the United States has shown how private giving can exacerbate 
inequality through the discretionary strengthening of schools in wealthy areas and tax breaks that 
disproportionately benefit the rich (Reich 2018) and through movement capture, whereby the 
structural aim to rebalance predatory aspects of capitalism and to narrow wealth gaps, including 
the growing racial wealth gap, is neutralized through tactical, pro-establishment grant making 
(Kohl-Arenas 2015, Ming Francis 2019). There is growing concern that large university 
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endowments also reinforce inequality, such as through driving up local real estate costs while 
qualifying for non-profit tax privileges (Burns & Douglas 2021). Over 2018 to 2019, the head of 
Harvard University’s endowment of $41 billion was paid between 6-8 million per year in 
remuneration, while one year later, in 2020, Harvard moved to lay off subcontracted dining 
workers and custodial stuff without pay during the coronavirus pandemic, only reversing course 
after facing public backlash. ‘The joke that Harvard is a hedge fund with an educational arm is 
not so far off,’ Haselby & Stoller (2021) write in the Chronicle of Higher Education. Many 
academics today work at institutions that have become model paragons of the philanthrocapitalist 
‘ideal,’ perhaps creating a structural disincentive to scrutinize negative ramifications, including 
inside the halls of the world’s wealthiest universities, where the proportionate of precarious, 
untenured staffs on short-term contracts is rising compared to tenured positions. 
Initiatives like the Giving Pledge, where billionaires pledge to give at least half of their 
fortunes away, have no enforcement mechanism. Such pledges perpetuate a facade of sacrifice. 
They foster undeserved reputational advantages, diverting attention from the known problems of 
corporate and personal tax avoidance, corporate reliance on draconian intellectual property 
protections that punish poor nations, and the exploitation of laborers in ways that are not 
alleviated but rather perpetuated despite claims of redressing inequality (Aschoff 2015, Edwards 
2010, 5, McGoey 2015). 
That philanthropy can deepen wealth concentration and inequality rather than alleviate it is, 
as many of the scholars above have emphasized, not a new concern. It is central to early liberal 
theories of the social contract. Thinkers such as Kant were explicit about the ways that noble 
claims of benevolence curtained the self-interest of the rich, entrenching privilege and power 
(Reich 2018). Kant’s contemporaries, such as Mary Wollstonecraft and Thomas Paine, called for 
the language and practice of natural rights to supplant the language of charity (McGoey 2019). 
Today, there is an important push from political theorists to revisit early-modern liberal thought 
to strengthen the political philosophy of philanthropy (Cordelli 2020; Reich 2018). But even this 
compelling scholarship, as well as a small but growing counter-literature that has challenged key 
claims within the shared-value framework, has some empirical lacunas and theoretical limits. My 
final section explores these limits. Drawing on classical liberal studies of the balance of power,, I 
point out why even this counter-literature has yet to fully appreciate the legal and democratic 
implications of the new ethos of market saviorism. 
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THE INHERENT COMPATIBILITY DOCTRINE AND ITS LIMITS 
An important counter-literature has begun to challenge Kramer and Porter’s claim that doing 
good financially can be neatly aligned with doing good socially (Crane et al. 2014, King & 
Pucker 2021). Crane et al. (2014), for example, argue that shared-value assumptions ignore the 
conflict between social goals and economic ones. They suggest that Kramer and Porter have tried 
to move beyond the language of a trade-off between profit seeking and public welfare largely by 
ignoring that any conflict exists. They point to microfinance as a good example, noting that 
Kramer and Porter continue to point to it as a touchstone success story of ‘shared-value,’ despite 
damning evidence of increased indebtedness among many recipients. A similar problem 
surrounds financing mechanisms that purport to find innovative financial solutions to challenges 
like disaster response, including natural pandemics such as coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-
19). In 2016, on the heels of the Ebola outbreak, the World Bank established a pandemic bond, a 
mechanism offering interest-paying bonds to investors, purportedly to build a store of funds to be 
released when poor nations face outbreaks. But the rules for releasing funds depended on 
private-sector stipulations for determining when a disease outbreak was severe enough to trigger 
the release of funds. The economist Lawrence Summers called the bond an “embarrassing 
mistake.’ Pointing out that it has been more financially advantageous to investors than to nations 
facing virus outbreaks, he stressed a conflict that should have been obvious at the outset: that 
private-sector investors in the bond “will always be averse to such a trigger declaration because 
it removes their profits’ (both quotes in Garrett 2019; see also Brim & Wenham 2019). Summers 
hits upon a simple but oddly neglected flaw with win-win frameworks: the fact that parties often 
win more financially the more that other parties lose out. In the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Garrett (2019) writes, “thousands of people have died due to a misguided finance-driven 
approach to fighting pandemics that puts investors before victims.” The examples of 
microfinance, mobile lending apps, and the World Bank’s first pandemic bond share a common 
problem: They work for investors but not for weaker parties in the transaction, for either 
indebted personal borrowers or indebted poor nations. And yet, despite some exceptions 
(Buchanan 2019, Crane et al. 2014, Edwards 2010, King & Pucker 2021, McGoey 2015, Morey 
2014), many scholars of philanthropy still shy from a close examination of either the theoretical 
roots of win-win mantras or their empirical effects. For example, Horvath & Powell (2020: 122) 
recently acknowledged in a chapter in The Nonprofit Handbook that philanthropic efforts to 
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leverage more business involvement in public services delivery has compounded creeping 
privatization but then conclude, “This chapter is not the venue for us to comment at length on 
whether we think such efforts are plausible or salutary.” If a widely read and consulted volume is 
not the place for two leading philanthropy scholars to consider the empirical effects of win-win 
frameworks, then where? 
The need to better scrutinize win-win rhetoric is particularly pressing given, as Morey 
(2014) is the first to note, observable legislative effects at the Supreme Court level. In a recent 
Supreme Court case, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), the court reached a 5–4 decision that, in 
sum, allowed certain for-profit corporations to refuse contraceptive health care coverage to 
employees because of religious objections. The relevance of this case for my discussion here is 
that, as Morey points out, Justice Alito’s majority opinion built on earlier social enterprise 
legislation passed by many US states to justify the court’s decision. This legislation stemmed 
from a seemingly innocuous, even auspicious, effort, partly financed by the Rockefeller 
Foundation, to allow the incorporation of benefit corporations. And yet the secondary 
ramifications of this push are sweeping. In licensing the existence of benefit corporations, state 
law has compounded a regulatory and legislative ethos that, as I emphasize below, jars 
aggressively with bedrock assumptions within democratic theories of law and governance. This 
ethos is legible in the wording of Justice Alito in his majority opinion. He wrote that social 
enterprise legislation has made clear the “inherent compatibility between establishing a for-profit 
corporation and pursuing nonprofit goals” (emphasis added). This recognition of ‘inherent 
compatibility’ between for-profit organization and nonprofit goal legitimated, in his view, the 
righteousness of offering for-profit corporations the same entitlement to religious objection that a 
nonprofit religious entity had: the right to deny contraceptive provision. As Morey points out, 
Justice Ginsburg, in a dissenting opinion, recognized the converse argument. She pointed out that 
courts had traditionally respected the distinction between for-profits and nonprofits and upheld it, 
in part because “for-profit corporations are different from religious nonprofits in that they use 
labor to make a profit” (quoted in Morey 2014). Morey’s important point is that the blending of a 
divide between for-profit and nonprofit entities can have unintended effects when it extends 
power vested in nonprofits to for-profit employers In this situation, it created a precedent 
enabling for-profit entities, which employ far more US workers than the nonprofit sector does, to 
limit the reproductive freedoms of women through permitting the refusal of insurance.  
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As Morey notes, this case also has even more troubling and sweeping ramifications than 
the limiting of reproductive flexibility, as worrying as that precedent is. In insisting on the 
inherent compatibility of for-profit corporations and nonprofit goals, Alito confers legal sanction 
on a precivil tenet: that belief that private enrichment is fundamentally harmonious with public 
welfare. As McGoey (2012, 2019) points out, the idea of natural compatibility between personal 
enrichment and a larger demos is more akin to feudal notions of monarchical divine right and 
feudal benevolence than to post-Enlightenment governance tenets that recognized the inherent 
conflict between private enrichment and public welfare (see McGoey 2012, 2019, Weingast 
2017). Although conflict between personal gain and public welfare has, of course, been 
acknowledged at least since antiquity (cf Meiksins Wood 2008), it has largely been modern 
constitutions, including the US Constitution, that have sought to enshrine efforts to mitigate this 
intractable conflict. The establishment of modern notions of rule of law, the subjection of rulers 
to the same standards and restrictions that a polity must face, is built upon the bedrock of making 
visible public–private conflicts and finding ways to restrain ruling entities from abusing a public 
for its own private gain, an imperative that Smith and his peers wrote about extensively 
(Weingast 2017). 
Today, superficial and misleading interpretations of the writing of thinkers such as Smith 
are pervasive, ignoring Smith’s fundamental identification of a conflict between profit seeking 
and public welfare. This myopia is clear in Pinker’s (2018) bestselling book Enlightenment Now. 
As mentioned above, Pinker sees Smith as the originator of the belief that “whatever tendency 
people have to care for their families and themselves can work to the good of all.” It is important 
to stress that this is Pinker’s wording, not Smith’s, who never claimed anything quite so breezy. 
Clearly, caring for one’s family does not necessarily ‘work’ for a wider public. Does a dictator 
appointing his children to positions of authority work for the benefit of all? Or a billionaire’s 
effort to avail herself of tax havens? Or a president’s ability to pay negligible federal tax? 
Indeed, Smith’s [1997 (1776)] point in Wealth of Nations was that concentrations of 
family wealth often come at the expense of public wealth. Flawed readings of Smith owe more to 
twentieth-century theorists such as Hayek and von Mises than to Smith’s actual writing 
(McGoey 2019). Hayek famously argued that market mechanisms could overcome the 
epistemological limits of central planners, leading to efficiency gains that deliberate design could 
never effect. As Hayek’s influence grew, a close reading of earlier classical theory declined 
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(Harcourt 2011). Later generations of economists either forget or deliberately obscured a key 
message of Smith, and before him Mandeville, who influenced Smith’s thought. As Hirschman 
(1997, p. 18) writes, although both Mandeville and Smith did hail the economic effects of self-
interest, they also stressed that such interests needed to be tamed through a strong state 
(Weingast 2017) and through regulatory powers, calling for the “Skilful Management of the 
Dextrous Politician” (Mandeville’s wording) to turn “private vices” into “public benefit.” 
Smith [1997 (1776), p. 156] is deeply critical of extending too much power to business 
merchants, particularly given their tendency to militate against the interest of workers: “Masters 
are always and every where in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise 
the wages of labor.” This recognition of conflict between “masters” and “workers” was 
fundamental to Smith’s call, in Wealth of Nations, for different forms of regulation to offset 
predatory practices, including his demand for governments to set limits on usury (McGoey 
2019). Today, any undergraduate economics student learns about Smith’s identification of the 
value of division of labor, but fewer learn about his discussion, inherited from earlier thinkers 
such as Montesquieu, of the importance of “mutual monitors” to act as checks on power 
(Boucoyannis 2007, Weingast 2017) and the need to separate judicial decision making from 
business interests (Harcourt 2011, McGoey 2019). 
The obvious concern of Smith and his contemporaries was to avoid a concentration of 
power, whether that power rested with monarchies or with monopoly business interests. Paine 
(1995, p. 191), for example, argued that insufficient separation between monarchs and merchants 
fueled a “rotary motion,” which led merchants to seek favor from government and vice versa in a 
corrupt manner that undermined public interest, enabling different branches to “cover each other 
until responsibility is lost.” Each of these thinkers stressed the reality of intractable conflict, 
rather than harmony, between private interests and public welfare, leading to the cornerstone 
principles of the need for a separation of powers to restrain the use of public funds for private 
benefit. 
The win-win narrative celebrated by Pinker, Gates, Kramer, and Porter assumes a 
harmony of interests in a way that Smith actually scoffed at, pointing out that merchants often 
present their interest as the general interest even when it is not and advising legislators to be on 
guard against this trick by maintaining “suspicious attention” to merchant claims. Friedman 
acknowledged this aspect of Smith in his own writing and drew on it to set boundaries around 
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the remit of corporate actors, which leads to an irony with how scholars such as Kramer and 
Porter perceive the work of scholars like Friedman and Hayek. 
In their writing on shared value, Kramer and Porter criticize Friedman’s infamous earlier 
call for businesses to focus exclusively on maximizing profits. Contra Friedman, they suggest 
that engaging in philanthropy can give businesses a better competitive edge while doing social 
good (Kramer & Porter 2002).  Bill Gates (2008) agrees, suggesting that that corporations should 
be subsidized to do “work that eases the world’s inequities.” But somewhat ironically, this 
enabled a shift to private authority that even someone as probusiness as Friedman had shied 
from. Not because Friedman (1970) could not see the capacity for greater corporate profits but 
because, as he writes in neglected sections of his influential essay, “The Social Responsibility of 
Business Is to Increase Its Profits,” he was concerned that doing so would open the door to more 
corporate regulation and stronger democratic oversight, a prospect that he found worrying. want. 
He states explicitly that emboldening corporations to fulfill social needs would entail too much 
intrusive public oversight over how corporations are run (Friedman 1970). Even Friedman did 
not imagine what has ensued: a transfer of power to corporations without a parallel growth in 
democratic checks and balances  that he assumed such a transfer would inevitably entail. 
Offsetting their own approach against Friedman’s cold business logic, today’s 
philanthrocapitalists claim to advance a more humane creative capitalism in which corporations 
partner harmoniously with governments to advance general social welfare. Yet, importantly, they 
also insist that businesses should be incentivized to do so through subsidies and contractual 
guarantees of profits (Gates 2008), while, with some isolated exceptions, rarely offering any 
financial or rhetorical support for strengthening corporate regulation. Stated intentions to soften 
the power of business have thus resulted in the opposite outcome: a transfer of power to private 
entities without any concomitant strengthening of democratic oversight or mandatory compliance 
with human rights laws, thereby compounding corporate harms against the public (Alston 2020, 
Amengual & Kuruvilla 2020, Baars 2020) 
CONCLUSION: CONFLICT REALISM AND THE ANTIDEMOCRATIC ILLUSION OF 
HARMONY 
Throughout this article, I have argued that despite the auspiciousness of words like shared value, 
win-win, and partnership, the philanthrocapitalist shift has led to unintended harms for different 
publics, facilitating the capture of public resources for private ends (Alston 2020, McGoey 
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2015). Philanthrocapitalism is a notion and practice that continues to entrench itself ever deeper 
within management teaching and public-sector procurement policies, even as damning evidence 
surrounding its harms grows (Alston 2020). Hype is triumphing over a sober assessment of 
social harms. In an ironic outcome, even the 2008 financial crisis, which illuminated various 
failings of finance, has in the end simply legitimated demands for greater social responsibility, 
thus enabling predatory partnerships and different forms of predatory inclusion to flourish (Kish 
& Leroy 2015, Seamster & Charron-Chénier 2017, Taylor 2019). 
The reality and scale of this corporate capture and its negative ramifications are not 
widely acknowledged, even in the vibrant, growing critical philanthropy literature. At the same 
time, there is extensive scholarship on the predatory nature of corporate partnerships in allied 
academic fields, such as international law (Alston 2020, Amengual & Kuruvilla 2020, Baars 
2020) and economic sociology (Taylor 2019). To fully understand the implications of the 
philanthrocapitalist turn, closer engagement between international law, economic sociology, and 
nonprofit scholarship is needed, helping to place what I term ‘conflict realism’ at the heart of 
studies of philanthrocapitalism and philanthropy more broadly today. 
A rich body of recent work has taken strides in furthering understanding of the negative 
democratic implications of philanthropic power, in part by returning to classic eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century texts (c.f. Cordelli 2020, Reich 2018). But to fully grasp the ramifications of 
the philanthrocapitalist turn today, more attention is needed not simply to classical liberal 
political philosophy but also to classical political economy, and particularly to the classical 
thinkers’ emphasis on rentier self-seeking and rentier power in ways that later schools, in 
particular Austrian economists such as Hayek and Friedman, ignored or distorted (McGoey 
2017, 2019). For example, de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America is regarding in philanthropy 
studies as a touchstone text for theorizing the importance of civil society and voluntary 
associations, but his concerns in the second volume of Democracy about corporate power and his 
calls for greater government regulation of business collectives are generally ignored (McGoey 
2019). There is similar neglect of Smith’s writing on usury regulation, the separation of powers, 
and the need for legislators to balance the interests of the poor against those of the rich.  
Another blind-spot in critical philanthropy literature is comparable neglect of the 
pernicious influence of centrist or left-leaning philanthropic foundations in entrenching anti-
democratic forms of corporate power today. While a rich body of recent scholarship has explored 
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how foundations seek to influence the law to enhance corporate power and private forms of 
authority, the focus tends to be on right-wing foundations, like the Koch Family Foundations, 
and their financial support of the Chicago and Virginia schools of economics, which in turn 
bolstered conservative legal movements (MacLean 2017;  Mayer 2016). With some notable 
exceptions, such as Morey’s criticism (2014) of the Rockefeller Foundation’s championing of 
benefit corporations, there has not been similar scrutiny of a separate assault on democratic 
checks and balances rooted in shared-value theories of business responsibility hailing from 
management theories at leading business school such as Harvard.  
This assault might well have been unwitting and unintended. It might well be that today’s 
win-win philanthrocapitalists esteem democratic governance and have not grasped the ways that 
claims of a natural harmony of interests can and does distort judicial and public understanding of 
the importance of a separation of private and public powers. But an assault on democratic checks 
has nonetheless transpired. Today, spurious assumptions of natural compatibility between private 
enrichment and public welfare are helping to legitimate an unprecedented transfer of greater 
power to corporate authorities in a manner that earlier democratic theorists saw as the duty of 
courts to keep in check.  
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